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For decades, the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
was largely uncontroversial. The great debates over the relation of
religion to government in our pluralistic republic-over school
prayer, aid to parochial schools, publicly sponsored religious sym-
bols, and religiously inspired legislation-almost without exception
were issues of establishment. Government support for religion, not
government interference with religion, was the issue.
Not that there was any shortage of free exercise cases or
closely divided Supreme Court decisions. And not that there was
any dearth of academic critics of the Court's doctrine.1 But free
exercise doctrine in the courts was stable, the noisy pressure
groups from the ACLU to the religious right were in basic agree-
ment, and most academic commentators were content to work out
the implications of the doctrine rather than to challenge it at its
roots.
There was, however, a peculiar quality to the consensus, which
may or may not have contributed to its stability: the free exercise
doctrine was more talk than substance. In its language, it was
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highly protective of religious liberty. The government could not
make or enforce any law or policy that burdened the exercise of a
sincere religious belief unless it was the least restrictive means of
attaining a particularly important ("compelling") secular objective.
In practice, however, the Supreme Court only rarely sided with the
free exercise claimant, despite some very powerful claims. The
Court generally found either that the free exercise right was not
burdened or that the government interest was compelling. In fact,
after the last major free exercise victory in 1972,2 the Court re-
jected every claim requesting exemption from burdensome laws or
policies to come before it except for those claims involving unem-
ployment compensation, which were governed by clear precedent.
This did not mean that the compelling interest test was dead, how-
ever. There were many more applications of the doctrine in the
state and lower federal courts, and legislatures and executive bod-
ies frequently conformed their decisions to its dictates. But at the
Supreme Court level, the free exercise compelling interest test was
a Potemkin doctrine.
With last April's Supreme Court decision in Employment Di-
vision v Smith,3 all that has changed. By a 5-4 vote (Justice
O'Connor concurring on different grounds), the Supreme Court
abandoned the compelling interest test, holding that "the right of
free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the
ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his reli-
gion prescribes (or proscribes).' ,,4 In other words, "an individual's
religious beliefs [do not] excuse him from compliance with an oth-
erwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regu-
late."'5 The Court acknowledged that "leaving accommodation to
the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those reli-
gious practices that are not widely engaged in."6 Calling this the
"unavoidable consequence of democratic government," the Court
stated that it "must be preferred to a system in which each con-
science is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social im-
portance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs."' ,
2 Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 US 205 (1972).
- 110 S Ct 1595 (1990).
1 Id at 1600, quoting United States v Lee, 455 US 252, 263 n 3 (1982) (Stevens
concurring).
5 110 S Ct at 1600.
6 Id at 1606.
7 Id.
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The Smith decision is undoubtedly the most important devel-
opment in the law of religious freedom in decades. Already it has
stimulated a petition for rehearing joined by an unusually broad-
based coalition of religious and civil liberties groups from right to
left and over a hundred constitutional law scholars, among them
myself, which proved futile,8 as well as a drive for legislative cor-
rection, which is presently under consideration in Congress.9 Free
exercise is no longer wanting for controversy.
The Smith decision has pushed to the forefront the central
issue of interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. Should it be
given a narrow interpretation, under which it would prohibit only
deliberate discrimination against religion? Or should it be given a
broad interpretation, under which it would provide maximum free-
dom for religious practice consistent with demands of public
order?
There are many ways in which to criticize the Smith decision.
Here, I wish to focus on two: the opinion's use of legal
sources-text, history, and precedent-and its theoretical argu-
ment. Problems of the first sort are of lesser interest, for they
might have been overcome (or at least mitigated) by writing the
opinion in a different way. Problems of the second sort are more
fundamental and suggest that Smith is contrary to the deep logic
of the First Amendment. Before turning to the sources and argu-
ment, however, we must take a look at the Smith case itself.
I. THE SMITH LITIGATION
Like many important cases, Smith was an unlikely vehicle for
reconsideration of fundamental doctrine. The case arose when two
employees at a drug rehabilitation clinic, Alfred Smith and Galen
Black, applied for unemployment compensation after they had
been fired for ingesting peyote for sacramental purposes at a cere-
mony of the Native American Church. The Employment Division
of the Oregon Department of Human Resources denied their claim
on the ground they had been dismissed for work-related "miscon-
duct," but the state appellate and supreme courts reversed on the
ground that the state may not constitutionally treat the exercise of
religious practices as "misconduct" warranting a denial of other-
wise available benefits. This holding appeared to be an unexcep-
S The Supreme Court denied the petition for rehearing, 110 S Ct 2605 (June 4, 1990).
' Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990, HR 5377, 101st Cong, 2d Sess, in 136
Cong Rec H5695 (July 26, 1990).
1990] 1111
The University of Chicago Law Review
tional application of settled precedent from the United States Su-
preme Court.'"
On certiorari, however, the Supreme Court vacated the judg-
ment and remanded to the Oregon court to decide whether the re-
ligious use of peyote is lawful in the state, reasoning that if a prac-
tice can be punished under the criminal law it may also be the
basis for the lesser penalty of denial of unemployment benefits.1
This disposition was odder than it might appear, since the Oregon
Supreme Court had already held that the criminality of peyote use
is "immaterial" to eligibility for unemployment benefits as a mat-
ter of state law.12 Under Oregon law, being fired for the use of pey-
ote was like being fired for not working on Saturday: both are
work-related derelictions which, if religiously motivated, could not
be treated as misconduct under the First Amendment.
On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court reiterated that the
criminality of the sacramental use of peyote is irrelevant under
both state and federal law, and reaffirmed its decision. The court
went on to say that Oregon drug law "makes no exception for the
sacramental use."" And although Oregon apparently does not now
enforce the law against sacramental peyote use, the court con-
cluded that enforcement, should it ever occur, would violate the
Free Exercise Clause.' 4
The United States Supreme Court again granted certiorari,
this time to decide whether a criminal law against peyote use is
constitutional. Smith thus involved a question that was entirely
hypothetical and, according to the highest court of Oregon, irrele-
vant to the outcome as a matter of state law. Looking ahead to the
result, it remains a mystery why Smith and Black were not entitled
to unemployment benefits even assuming the Supreme Court was
correct on the merits. Granted, the state could, consistent with the
Free Exercise Clause, deny benefits for any activity that violates
the criminal law. But according to the Oregon Supreme Court's
10 The unemployment compensation cases are discussed below. See text at notes 56-66.
11 Employment Division v Smith (Smith 1), 485 US 660, 670 (1988). Justice Stevens
wrote the majority opinion. Curiously, in Idaho Department of Employment v Smith, 434
US 100, 104 (1977) (Stevens dissenting in part), in which the Court reversed a state court
decision holding that a denial of unemployment benefits violates the Equal Protection
Clause, Stevens took the position that when a state supreme court grants its citizens "more
protection than the Federal Constitution requires, I do not believe that error is a sufficient
justification for the exercise of this Court's discretionary jurisdiction." One can only specu-
late as to why Justice Stevens took a different view in the Oregon Smith case.
" Smith v Employment Division, 301 Or 209, 721 P2d 445, 449-50 (1986).
" Smith v Employment Division, 307 Or 68, 763 P2d 146, 148 (1988).
14 763 P2d at 148.
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construction of state law, Oregon had not availed itself of that op-
portunity. Until it does, there would seem to be no basis in state or
federal law for denying benefits to Smith and Black.15 And if that
is true, then the entire discussion of free exercise exemptions was
beyond the Court's jurisdiction.
The briefs and arguments in the Supreme Court focused en-
tirely bn whether the state has a sufficiently compelling interest in
controlling drug use to overcome the free exercise rights of Native
American Church members. This may be considered a close ques-
tion. Drug laws are undoubtedly important, and it is intuitively
plausible that even closely cabined exemptions would seriously
erode enforcement of the law. Justice O'Connor concurred in the
result on this ground.16 On the other hand, peyotism is an ancient
religious practice and peyote use does not, according to the weight
of expert opinion, cause any of the problems associated with drug
abuse. Moreover, the drug is unpleasant to use and not part of
drug trafficking. In fact, twenty-three states specifically exempt the
religious use of peyote from their drug laws, the federal govern-
ment not only exempts peyote but licenses its production and im-
portation, and Oregon itself apparently does not enforce its law
with regard to peyote use. 17 This suggests that the government's
interest was not strong. Had the case been decided either way on
this ground, it would have had little doctrinal importance.
The most important thing to know about the briefs in Smith
is what they did not contain: neither of the parties asked the Court
to reconsider its free exercise doctrine. The State expressly con-
ceded the compelling interest test in its brief and the parties did
not discuss the doctrinal issue at oral argument.' 8 The Court's dis-
position thus stands in marked contrast to its usual practice of re-
questing additional briefing and reargument in cases in which it
decides to reconsider established precedent.19 Justice Stevens, a
member of the Smith majority, has in other contexts criticized the
Court for ordering reargument on issues not raised by the parties.
"As I have said before, 'the adversary process functions most effec-
" The Supreme Court did not overrule the unemployment compensation cases on
which the Oregon court had relied, see Smith, 110 S Ct at 1602-03, so the federal constitu-
tional basis for the lower court's holding remained intact but for the criminality of peyote
use.
16 Id at 1613-15 (O'Connor concurring).
17 See id at 1617, 1618 n 5 (Blackmun dissenting), and sources cited therein.
138 Id; Brief for Respondent at 11-12.
19 See, for example, Patterson v McLean Credit Union, 485 US 617 (1988); San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority v Garcia, 469 US 528 (1985).
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tively when we rely on the initiative of lawyers, rather than the
activism of judges, to fashion the questions for review.' ",o It is
presumably even more inappropriate for the Court to decide the
case on a basis other than the issues presented without asking for
briefing or argument.
The most important decision interpreting the Free Exercise
Clause in recent history, then, was rendered in a case in which the
question presented was entirely hypothetical, irrelevant to the dis-
position of the case as a matter of state law, and neither briefed
nor argued by the parties.
II. THE OPINION'S USE OF LEGAL SOURCES
A. Text
The Smith opinion begins, quite properly, with a considera-
tion of the constitutional text: "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof."2 1 The opinion notes, also quite properly, that "the
'exercise of religion' often involves not only belief and profession
but the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts: assem-
bling with others for a worship service, participating in sacramen-
tal use of bread and wine, proselytizing, abstaining from certain
foods or certain modes of transportation. 2 2 The conclusion that
the clause protects conduct as well as speech or belief would seem
to follow from its very words: "exercise" means conduct.2 3 The
point is corroborated by extensive evidence from the period of the
Founding2 and is important because the Supreme Court originally
held the opposite, in reliance on a misleading statement by
Thomas Jefferson.25
21 Patterson, 485 US at 623 (Stevens dissenting), quoting New Jersey v TLO, 468 US
1214, 1216 (1984) (Stevens dissenting from order directing reargument).
21 US Const, Amend I, quoted in 110 S Ct at 1599 (emphasis omitted).
2 110 S Ct at 1599.
2 The American edition of Samuel Johnson's A Dictionary of the English Language,
published in Philadelphia in 1805, used the following terms to define "exercise": "Labour of
the body," "Use; actual application of any thing," "Task; that which one is appointed to
perform," and "Act of divine worship whether publick or private." Noah Webster's A Dic-
tionary of the English Language, published in New Haven in 1807, defined "exercise" as
"practice [or] employment." James Buchanan's 1757 Linguae Britannicae Vera Pronuncia-
tio, published in London, gave the definition "To use or practice."
2 See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Ex-
ercise of Religion, 103 Harv L Rev 1409, 1451-52, 1488-90 (1990).
25 Reynolds v United States, 98 US 145, 164 (1879). Jefferson had written that "the
legislative powers of government reach actions only, and not opinions.... [M]an. .. has no
natural right in opposition to his social duties." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to a Commit-
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Having repudiated the belief-conduct distinction, the Court
went on to note that the language of the Free Exercise Clause does
not conclusively resolve whether the provision requires exemptions
from generally applicable laws. The opinion is careful not to over-
state its point. It merely holds that "[a]s a textual matter, we do
not think the words must be given that meaning. 2 6 Moreover,
"[i]t is a permissible reading of the text.., to say that if prohibit-
ing the exercise of religion ... is not the object of the [law] but
merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise
valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended. 2 7
The Court does not deny that the broader reading, which would
require exemptions, is likewise a "permissible" reading. Indeed,
the Court does not even deny that it is the more obvious and lit-
eral meaning. It is sufficient, according to the Court, that the
words are not ironclad. Having determined that the words are not
dispositive, the opinion then turns to the Court's precedents and
the text plays no further role in the decision.
This is a strange and unconvincing way to deal with the text
of the Constitution, or of any law. A court should not disregard the
text merely because it contains some degree of ambiguity. Rather,
a court should determine the reading of the text that is most prob-
able and should give that reading presumptive weight unless there
is good evidence based on extratextual sources that it is wrong.
A plausible argument available to the Court was that the verb
"prohibiting" means the deliberate targeting of the prohibited ac-
tivity, so that the exercise of religion is not "prohibited" if the ex-
ercise merely happens to fall within a broad class of proscribed ac-
tivities. However, the more natural reading of the term is that it
prevents the government from making a religious practice illegal. If
a zoning ordinance limits a particular area to residential use, we
would naturally say that it "prohibits" an ice cream store within
the zone-even though no one on the zoning commission had any
particular intention with respect to ice cream. While we cannot
rule out the possibility that the term "prohibiting" might im-
pliedly be limited to laws that prohibit the exercise of religion in a
particular way-that is, in a discriminatory fashion-we should at
tee of the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan 1820), in Andrew Adgate Liscomb, ed, 16 The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 281, 281-82 (Thomas Jefferson Memorial Ass'n, 1903).
21 Smith, 110 S Ct at 1599 (emphasis added).
'7 Id at 1600.
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least begin with the presumption that the words carry as broad a
meaning as their natural usage.2"
Further, it is significant that the provision is expressed in ab-
solute terms. Unlike the Fourth Amendment, the First Amend-
ment does not limit itself to prohibitions that are "unreasonable."
Unlike the Fifth Amendment, the First Amendment does not au-
thorize deprivations of liberty with due process of law. Any limita-
tion on the absolute character of the freedom guaranteed by the
First Amendment must be implied from necessity, since it is not
implied by the text. And while I do not deny that there must be
implied limitations, it is more faithful to the text to confine any
implied limitations to those that are indisputably necessary. It is
odd, given this text, to allow the limitations to swallow up so
strongly worded a rule.2 9
This does not mean that the text of the Free Exercise Clause
is sufficiently unambiguous that the Smith decision can be rejected
on textual grounds alone. But it does suggest that the Court gave
insufficient weight to the text. Discovery of a degree of ambiguity
is not a license to move on to other sources of enlightenment. A
Court that is serious about interpreting a written Constitution
should be more anxious to ensure that its reading is the most per-
suasive from among the "permissible" readings of the clause.
B. History
Having established to its satisfaction that both the exemptions
and no-exemptions readings of the Free Exercise Clause are "per-
missible reading[s] of the text," the Supreme Court then noted
that "[o]ur decisions reveal that the latter reading is the correct
one.""0 Interestingly, the Court did not pause to consider whether
the historical context surrounding the adoption of the Free Exer-
cise Clause might have a bearing on the two permissible readings
2 The harder question is whether government actions that inhibit but do not forbid
religious exercise are covered by the clause. Elsewhere, I have argued that the historical
context makes it doubtful that the term "prohibiting" was intended or understood to be
strictly limited in this sense. McConnell, 103 Harv L Rev at 1486-88 (cited in note 24).
Paradoxically, Smith appears to assume that a strict prohibition through criminal sanctions
is less likely to violate the Free Exercise Clause than a denial of benefits. See 110 S Ct at
1603.
29 See Douglas Laycock, Text, Intent, and the Religion Clauses, 4 Notre Dame J L,
Ethics & Pub Pol 683, 688 (1990). On the other hand, my colleague, Dean Geoffrey Stone,
made the excellent point in a conversation with me that if the protection accorded free
exercise is close to absolute, this is an argument that the domain of the Clause should be
read narrowly.
30 110 S Ct at 1600.
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of the text. This is particularly surprising because the author of
the majority opinion, Justice Scalia, has been one of the Court's
foremost exponents of the view that the Constitution should be in-
terpreted in light of its original meaning.3 1
This is not the occasion to revisit the originalism debate. Suf-
fice it to say that even those Justices and commentators who be-
lieve that the historical meaning is not dispositive ordinarily agree
that it is a relevant consideration.2 It is remarkable that the Court
would take so important a step here without so much as referring
to the history of the Free Exercise Clause.
Had the Court looked to the history of the Free Exercise
Clause, it would have found some significant evidence supporting
its conclusion that the clause was not expected or intended to al-
low judges to craft exemptions from laws of general applicability.
Certainly, that was John Locke's position-and Locke was a major
intellectual influence on the idea of religious toleration in colonial
America." It appears also to have been Jefferson's position. In-
deed, Jefferson's position was in many respects more restrictive
than Locke's." Moreover, although couched in qualifying language
that seems to point the other way, passages in the writings of such
evangelical advocates of religious freedom as William Penn and
John Leland can be interpreted as rejecting free exercise exemp-
tions. 5 And the highest courts of two states, Pennsylvania and
South Carolina, interpreted their state constitutional guarantees in
the early nineteenth century as not requiring exemptions.3
On the other hand, the history would have revealed other evi-
dence-more substantial, in my judgment-in favor of the broader
exemptions position. For example, one can look to the various
state constitutional provisions regarding free exercise of religion,
eight of which expressly and one of which impliedly contained lan-
guage that appears to be an early equivalent of the "compelling
interest" test. 7 Article 61 of the Georgia Constitution of 1777 is
typical: "All persons whatever shall have the free exercise of their
81 See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U Cin L Rev 849 (1989).
3' For a recent example, in which all nine Justices, in both the majority and dissent,
relied heavily-of the historical understanding of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment, see Browning-Ferris Industries v Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S Ct 2909, 2914-19
(1989); see also id at 2926-31 (O'Connor dissenting).
3 See McConnell, 103 Harv L Rev at 1430-35, 1443-49 (cited in note 24).
34 Id at 1451-52.
35 Id at 1447-48.
36 Id at 1506-11.
37 See id at 1457 n 242.
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religion; provided it be not repugnant to the peace and safety of
the State."3 8 It is difficult to reconcile these provisions with the
narrow reading of free exercise. If the free exercise guarantees
could not be read to exempt believers from "otherwise valid" laws,
what could have been the purpose of the "peace and safety" pro-
viso? These provisions were the likely model for the federal free
exercise guarantee, and their evident acknowledgment of free exer-
cise exemptions is the strongest evidence that the framers expected
the First Amendment to enjoy a similarly broad interpretation.
The idea of exemptions had deep roots in early colonial char-
ters. As early as 1665, the second Charter of Carolina, in recogni-
tion of the fact that "it may happen that some of the people and
inhabitants of the said province cannot, in their private opinions,
conform" to the Church of England, authorized the proprietors "to
give and grant unto such person and persons.., such indulgences
and dispensations, in that behalf [as they] shall, in their discretion,
think fit and reasonable. 3 9 "Indulgences" and "dispensations"
were technical legal terms of the day, referring to the King's as-
serted power to exempt citizens from the enforcement of a law en-
acted by Parliament.0 It is noteworthy that from the beginning it
was thought that the solution to the problem of religious minori-
ties was to grant exemptions from generally applicable laws.
The practice of the colonies and early states bore this out.
Most of the colonies and states (beginning with those with strong
free exercise provisions in their organic laws) exempted religious
objectors from military conscription and from oath requirements
expressly in order to avoid infringements of their religious con-
science.41 To be sure, the need for exemptions did not often arise.
Because the vast majority of the inhabitants were Protestant
Christians and the laws tended to reflect the Protestant viewpoint,
clashes between conscience and law were rare. It is significant,
however, that exemptions were seen as a solution to the conflict
when it occurred.
We should not be too quick to assume that this practice sup-
ports the broad reading of the Free Exercise Clause, however. The
exemptions in the pre-Constitutional period were made by legisla-
38 Ben Perley Poore, ed, 1 Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and
Other Organic Laws of the United States 383 (GPO, 2d ed 1878) ("Poore's").
" 2 Poore's at 1397 (cited in note 38).
40 See Frederick Pollack and Frederic William Maitland, 2 The History of English Law
389 (Cambridge, 2d ed 1899).
"I For these and other examples, see McConnell, 103 Harv L Rev at 1466-73 (cited in
note 24).
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tures and therefore do not prove that religious objectors were enti-
tled to exemptions by right. Indeed, these exemptions are fully
consistent with the position in Smith, because Smith allows legis-
latures (although not courts) to make exemptions from laws of
general applicability. This type of evidence is therefore necessarily
ambiguous.
On the other hand, we must not forget that in the period
before judicial review it was the legislatures that had the sole re-
sponsibility for upholding constitutional norms. If legislatures con-
ceived of exemptions as an appropriate response to conflicts be-
tween law and conscience, there is every reason to suppose that the
framers and ratifiers of the federal Constitution would expect judi-
cially enforceable constitutional protections for religious con-
science to be interpreted in much the same manner. In this, the
Free Exercise Clause is no different from other constitutional pro-
visions. To a large extent, the rights enshrined in our Constitution
are simply rights that had come to be recognized under statute or
common law prior to 1789. The best interpretive assumption is
that only the institutional mode of protection-but not the sub-
stantive content-was changed when these rights gained constitu-
tional status.
It is also worth mentioning that James Madison, principal au-
thor and floor leader of the First Amendment, advocated free exer-
cise exemptions, at least in some contexts, and proposed language
for the Virginia free exercise clause that was even more protective
than the "peace and safety" provisos of most states. 42 To the ex-
tent that the opinions of individual framers are significant, his es-
pousal of exemptions should carry more weight than Jefferson's
opposition.
Whatever one might conclude from this history, the Supreme
Court should not have rendered a major reinterpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause without even glancing in its direction. Had
the Court made even a cursory inquiry into the history of the
clause, it would have been impossible for it to toss off the remark
that the compelling interest test "contradicts both constitutional
tradition and common sense. '43 At most, the Court could have said
that there are two constitutional traditions, both with impressive
pedigrees, and that persons of common sense and good will have
come down on both sides of the question.
42 See id at 1452-55, 1462-64, 1500. Madison also would have constitutionalized the reli-
gious exemption from conscription. Id at 1500.
43 110 S Ct at 1603.
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C. Precedent
Having dismissed the text as ambiguous and ignored the his-
tory, the Court in Smith purported to base its decision on prece-
dent. But its use of precedent is troubling, bordering on the shock-
ing. A detailed examination of both those precedents on which the
Court relied and those that it distinguished is necessary to reveal
the full extent of the liberties the Court took with its earlier
decisions.
1. Never say never.
The Smith opinion states baldly: "We have never held that an
individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an
otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to
regulate.""" In Wisconsin v Yoder, however, the Court had stated
that "[a] regulation neutral on its face may, in its application,
nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for government
neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion."'45 In-
deed, the Yoder Court stated that "[t]he essence of all that has
been said and written on the subject is that only those interests of
the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance
legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion."46 In Yoder, the
Court called a generally applicable compulsory school attendance
law, as applied to Amish children above the eighth grade, "pre-
cisely the kind of objective danger to the free exercise of religion
that the First Amendment was designed to prevent. '47 The com-
pelling interest test has been applied numerous times since Yoder.
The Court reiterated the compelling interest test no fewer than
three times in the year preceding Smith, including in two unani-
mous opinions.48
Prior to Smith, some Justices disagreed with the precedents
holding that the Free Exercise Clause requires exemptions from
generally-applicable laws, but none denied the existence of those
precedents. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens had au-
thored several separate concurrences and dissents in previous cases
taking the Court to task for doing precisely what the Smith opin-
44 Id at 1600.
4' 406 US 205, 220 (1972).
48 Id at 215.
47 Id at 218.
48 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v Board of Equalization, 110 S Ct 688, 693 (1990); Her-
nandez v Commissioner, 109 S Ct 2136, 2148 (1989); Frazee v Illinois Department of Em-
ployment Security, 489 US 829 (1989).
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ion now denies the Court had ever done."9 Even Justice Scalia,
fourteen months before writing the Smith opinion, stated in a dis-
senting opinion in an Establishment Clause case that the Court
had "held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
required religious beliefs to be accommodated by granting religion-
specific exemptions from otherwise applicable laws,"50 listing four
illustrative cases, including Yoder. 1 Three of the five Justices in
the Smith majority signed their names to this statement. What
happened in the ensuing fourteen months to change their minds?
2. Precedents distinguished.
a) Yoder. According to the Court in Smith, "[t]he only de-
cisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars ap-
plication of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously moti-
vated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but
the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional
protections. ' 52 Yoder is explained as involving "the rights of par-
ents to direct the religious upbringing of their children. ' 53 But the
opinion in Yoder expressly stated that parents do not have the
right to violate the compulsory education laws for nonreligious rea-
sons.5 4 Thus, according to Yoder parents have no right indepen-
dent of the Free Exercise Clause to withhold their children from
school, and according to Smith they have no such right under the
Free Exercise Clause. How can claimants be entitled to greater re-
lief under a "hybrid" claim than they could attain under either of
the components of the hybrid? One suspects that the notion of
"hybrid" claims was created for the sole purpose of distinguishing
Yoder in this case.
9 See Thomas v Review Board, 450 US 707, 723 (1981) (Rehnquist dissenting); Hobbie
v Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 US 136, 147 (1987) (Rehnquist dissenting) (adher-
ing to his position in Thomas); United States v Lee, 455 US 252, 263 (1982) (Stevens con-
curring). It is reported that Chief Justice Rehnquist publicly acknowledged at the Fourth
Circuit Judicial Conference that Smith "represents a new departure in this line of cases."
Tony Mauro, With Remarkable Swiftness, an Era Ends, 13 Legal Times of Wash 8, 9 (Aug
6, 1990).
" Texas Monthly, Inc. v Bullock, 109 S Ct 890, 912 (1989) (Scalia dissenting) (empha-
sis in original).
"I See also Edwards v Aguillard, 482 US 578, 617 (1987) (Scalia dissenting) (character-
izing five cases, including Yoder, as holding "that in some circumstances States must accom-
modate the beliefs of religious citizens by exempting them from generally applicable
regulations").
52 110 S Ct at 1601.
Il Id at 1601 n 1, quoting Yoder, 406 US at 233.
54 406 US at 215-16.
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But does it serve even that purpose? Why isn't Smith itself a
"hybrid" case? Whatever else it might accomplish, the perfor-
mance of a sacred ritual like the ingestion of peyote communicates,
in a rather dramatic way, the participants' faith in the tenets of
the Native American Church. Smith and Black could have made a
colorable claim under the Free Speech Clause that the prohibition
of peyote use interfered with their ability to communicate this
message. If burning a flag is speech because it communicates a po-
litical belief,55 ingestion of peyote is no less. And even if Smith and
Black would lose on a straight free speech claim, following the logic
of Smith's explanation of Yoder, why shouldn't their claim prevail
as a "hybrid" with their free exercise claim? The answer, a legal
realist would tell us, is that the Smith Court's notion of "hybrid"
claims was not intended to be taken seriously.
b) The unemployment cases. The Smith Court had even
more difficulty distinguishing a line of cases involving unemploy-
ment compensation for unemployment caused by religious objec-
tions to available work. There have been four such cases, the most
recent being a unanimous decision only a year before Smith. 6
These cases have generally been considered prime examples of free
exercise exemptions from generally applicable laws, because work-
ers are excused from the requirement of accepting any "suitable"
employment.5 Even though workers who decline work for other
important, conscientious reasons (for example, because of ideologi-
cal objections to the work or because of the need to care for a de-
pendent) would not receive unemployment compensation, 5 work-
ers who decline work for religious reasons must be given benefits.
The Smith Court began its discussion of these cases by noting
-that the compelling interest test had not led to the invalidation of
Texas v Johnson, 109 S Ct 2533 (1989).
" Mysteriously, the Smith Court said there were only three, omitting the most recent. I
can offer no explanation for this omission. The four cases are Frazee v Illinois Department
of Employment Security, 489 US 829 (1989); Hobbie v Unemployment Appeals Commis-
sion, 480 US 136 (1987); Thomas v Review Board, 450 US 707 (1981); Sherbert v Verner,
374 US 398 (1963).
5' It must be noted that the unemployment compensation cases are thought problem-
atic even by some commentators who otherwise endorse the compelling interest test, on the
ground that they may place religious workers in a position superior to others. For a discus-
sion of these issues, see Michael W. McConnell and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Ap-
proach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U Chi L Rev 1, 35-38, 40-41 (1989).
" See Wimberly v Labor and Industrial Relations Comm'n, 479 US 511 (1987) (hold-
ing that worker unemployed on account of pregnancy is not entitled to unemployment
compensation).
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any government action "except the denial of unemployment com-
pensation," 59 as if that were a coherent distinction. Beyond that,
the Court noted that the unemployment compensation cases in-
volved "a context that lent itself to individualized governmental
assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct."6 The unem-
ployment cases thus "stand for the proposition that where the
State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not
refuse to extend that system to cases of 'religious hardship' with-
out compelling reason. '61 On its face, this is not a very persuasive
distinction. Difficulty of administration can fairly constitute at
least part of the governmental interest in enforcing the law without
exceptions,"2 but it is hard to see why this concern should limit the
universe of potential claims. Moreover, if this is the distinction, it
is hard to see why the compelling interest test does not apply to
many contexts other than just unemployment compensa-
tion-indeed, to the full universe of claims governed by the due
process requirement of "some kind of hearing."
Under this analysis, most of the Supreme Court's free exercise
cases resemble the unemployment compensation cases in that they
involve individuated governmental assessments of the claimant's
circumstances. In United States v Lee, for example, a procedural
mechanism already existed for administering religious objections to
social security taxation. In Lyng v Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n, the Forest Service was already required to study
and consider the impact of the logging road on Native American
religious practices as well as on the environment. ' Indeed, every
decision to build a road must be made on a case-by-case basis. In
O'Lone v Estate of Shabazz, prison officials had informally accom-
modated the religious needs of the Muslim prisoners but stopped
doing so, apparently because the officials interpreted a prison di-
rective to disallow the accommodation." These cases are typical.
59 110 S Ct at 1602.
60 Id at 1603.
61 Id. This explanation for the unemployment compensation cases has had a checkered
career in recent Supreme Court decisions. It was first propounded in a plurality opinion
written by Chief Justice Burger in Bowen v Roy, 476 US 693, 708 (1986). It was rejected by
a majority of six Justices in Hobbie, 480 US at 142 n 7, including two (White and Scalia)
who formed part of the majority in Smith. It now appears to command the votes of the five
Justices in the Smith majority.
62 See Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw U L Rev
146, 155-58 (1986).
63 455 US 252, 260 (1982).
64 485 US 439, 442 (1988).
65 482 US 342, 346 (1987).
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In each of them the government "ha[d] in place a system of indi-
vidual exemptions."6 6 The unemployment cases cannot be distin-
guished on this ground.
Even more strikingly, the "individual governmental assess-
ment" distinction cannot explain the result in Smith itself. If
Smith is viewed as an unemployment compensation case, the dis-
tinction is obviously spurious. If Smith is viewed as a hypothetical
criminal prosecution for peyote use, there would be an individual
governmental assessment of the defendants' motives and actions in
the form of a criminal trial.
The purported distinction thus has no obvious connection to
either the circumstance of Smith or to the Court's precedents. Like
the distinction of Yoder, it appears to have one function only: to
enable the Court to reach the conclusion it desired in Smith with-
out openly overruling any prior decisions.
3. Precedents relied on.
More surprising than the precedents distinguished were the
precedents relied upon. The Court relied most heavily, with
lengthy quotation, on Minersville School District v Gobitis, the
first flag salute case, which allowed the criminal prosecution of
school children for refusing on religious grounds to recite the
Pledge of Allegiance. 7 The Court neglected to mention that, three
years after Gobitis, it overruled the case in one of the most cele-
brated of all opinions under the Bill of Rights."' Relying on Gobitis
without mentioning Barnette is like relying on Plessy v Ferguson69
without mentioning Brown v Board of Education.70
The second case cited by the Court, a Mormon polygamy case
from 1879, was decided on the theory that the Free Exercise
Clause protects only beliefs and not conduct 1-a premise that the
Court repudiated in 1940.72 Because the Smith Court expressly re-
affirmed that the Free Exercise Clause protects conduct as well as
belief,7 3 why does it cite a decision predicated on the opposite
66 Smith, 110 S Ct at 1603.
67 310 US 586, 595 (1940). Gobitis is cited twice in Smith, 110 S Ct at 1600.11 West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624 (1943).
69 163 US 537 (1896).
70 347 US 483 (1954). Of course, the Court could have pointed out that since Barnette
was decided on free speech grounds, Gobitis was not technically overruled. But by the same
token, since Brown was decided as an education case, Plessy was not overruled, either.
71 Reynolds v United States, 98 US 145, 166-67 (1879).
71 Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 US 296, 303-04 (1940).
73 110 S Ct at 1599.
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premise? The third citation is to a concurring opinion attacking
the majority's use of the compelling interest test. 4 The fourth is to
Gobitis again. Thus, the primary affirmative precedent marshalled
by the Court to support its decision consists entirely of overruled
and minority positions.
Then follow two older cases in which the Court upheld laws
against free exercise challenges, both decided prior to the formal
announcement of the compelling interest test. In Prince v Massa-
chusetts, the Court upheld a conviction under the child labor laws
for the distribution of a religious publication by a minor in the
company of her guardian. 5 Significantly, the Court in Prince did
not so much as mention that the law in question was neutral and
generally applicable. Rather, it relied on the principle that "[t]he
state's authority over children's activities is broader than over like
actions of adults. '76 While conceding that the law in question
would be "invalid" if it were "applicable to adults or all persons
generally,"'77 the Prince Court concluded that the possibility of
''emotional excitement and psychological or physical injury" to a
minor from what it called "[s]treet preaching" was sufficient to
support the state law.7"
In Braunfeld v Brown, the Court upheld application of a Sun-
day closing law to a Jewish merchant on the ground that it consti-
tuted "only an indirect burden on the exercise of religion," by
which the Court meant a law that makes the religious practice
more costly but not illegal.79 The clear implication was that a "di-
rect" interference would have been unconstitutional, a proposition
contradicted in Smith80 Thus, neither Prince nor Braunfeld sup-
ports the holding of Smith. In fact, the rationales of the decisions
point to the opposite interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.
" United States v Lee, 455 US 252, 263 n 3 (1982) (Stevens concurring).
75 321 US 158, 170 (1944).
71 Id at 168.
7 Id at 167.
78 Id at 169-70. It is interesting, and a little troubling, that the Prince Court analyzed
the general child labor law as if it were specifically directed at religious or political activity
and upheld it on that ground. According to the Court, "[t]he zealous though lawful exercise
of the right to engage in propagandizing the community, whether in religious, political or
other matters, may and at times does create situations difficult enough for adults to cope
with and wholly inappropriate for children, especially of tender years, to face." This hints
that the controversial nature of street proselytizing or political activity, and the possible
adverse reaction of others, provide a sound basis for limiting the rights of youthful speakers.
79 366 US 599, 606 (1961).
80 110 S Ct at 1603 (under Court's precedents, the Free Exercise Clause has "nothing to
do with an across-the-board criminal prohibition on a particular form of conduct"). There
can be no more "direct" burden on free exercise than an absolute criminal prohibition.
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The Court then adverted to three modern cases rejecting free
exercise claims on the basis of the compelling interest test."1 One
would think these were precedents against the theory of Smith,
because they unequivocally applied the very constitutional stan-
dard that Smith stated had "never" been applied. The Court now
asserts that it only "purported" to apply the compelling interest
test in those recent cases.8
2
The Court also relied on four recent decisions that did not em-
ploy the compelling interest test. One of these cases involved the
military and another the prison system; both opinions stressed the
limited reach of constitutional rights in those special, confined set-
tings.8 3 It is not auspicious for the Court to measure the constitu-
tional rights of free civilians according to the rights of prisoners
and military personnel.
The other two cases in which the Court did not apply the com-
pelling interest test involved claimants who objected to the inter-
nal procedures of the government or to the government's use of its
own land.84 Again, it is not auspicious for the rights of individuals
to be free from government interference with their religious prac-
tices to be compared to the rights of individuals to compel the gov-
ernment to behave in conformity to their religious principles.8 5 In
effect, the Court converted exceptional cases into the general rule.
81 Gillette v United States, 401 US 437, 461-62 (1971) (rejecting religious exemption
from conscription on the part of a claimant who was not opposed to fighting in all wars);
United States v Lee, 455 US 252, 261 (1982) (rejecting claim to exemption from social se-
curity taxes by Amish farmers whose religious tenets would not permit them to participate
in the program); Hernandez v Commissioner, 109 S Ct 2136, 2148-49 (1989) (rejecting claim
for income tax deductibility of certain religious payments).
82 110 S Ct at 1602.
83 Goldman v Weinberger, 475 US 503, 507-08 (1986) (rejecting free exercise challenge
to Air Force uniform regulations by Orthodox Jew barred from wearing a yarmulke); O'Lone
v Estate of Shabazz, 482 US 342, 349 (1987) (holding that prison officials do not have a duty
to accommodate prison work schedules to Muslim inmates' religious observances).
8 Bowen v Roy, 476 US 693 (1986) (holding that a state welfare agency's use of social
security numbers does not violate the Free Exercise Clause); Lyng v Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 US 439 (1988) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause does
not prohibit the government from permitting timber harvesting and road construction in
area of a national forest traditionally used by Indians for religious purposes).
8 In both Roy and Lyng, the Court reasoned that the First Amendment does not "re-
quire the government itself to behave in ways that the individual believes will further his or
her spiritual development. ... The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to
require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the
religious beliefs of particular citizens." Roy, 476 US at 699 (emphasis in original). See also
Lyng, 485 US at 449. Smith, of course, involved whether the individual believer could con-
duct his affairs in accordance with his religious beliefs. To the extent Lyng holds that the
Free Exercise Clause does not constrain the government's actions in its capacity as land-
owner, I disagree with its reasoning, as well as its result; but I agree that the constitutional
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The Court also failed to point out that in one of these cases,
Bowen v Roy, five Justices expressed the view that adherents to a
traditional Abenaki religion under which computer-generated
numbers are deemed to rob the individual's spirit of its power were
entitled to ai exemption from the requirement that welfare recipi-
ents provide a social security number on their application. 6 This
did not become a holding of the Court because one of the five Jus-
tices supporting the result concluded that this aspect of the case
had become moot."' But it is surely misleading for the Smith Court
to rely on the Bowen Court's holding-that the claimants had no
right to insist that the government not use a social security num-
ber already in its possession-to support a conclusion that the
Free Exercise Clause does not require exemptions from generally
applicable laws; a majority of the Bowen Court firmly stated that
another claim for exemption in the same case was constitutionally
compelled.
4. Was there really a compelling interest test?
Notwithstanding all that has just been said about the Court's
reliance on precedent, it must be conceded that the Supreme Court
before Smith did not really apply a genuine "compelling interest"
test. Such a test would allow the government to override a religious
objection only in the most extraordinary of circumstances. In an
area of law where a genuine "compelling interest" test has been
applied, intentional discrimination against a racial minority, no
such interest has been discovered in almost half a century. Even
the Justices committed to the doctrine of free exercise exemptions
have in fact applied a far more relaxed standard to these cases,
and they were correct to do so. 8 The "compelling interest" stan-
dard is a misnomer.89
standard for such action should be less exacting than for the government in its capacity as
regulator.
86 476 US at 712-16 (Blackmun concurring in part); id at 724-32 (O'Connor, joined by
Brennan and Marshall, concurring in part and dissenting in part); id at 733 (White
dissenting).
476 US at 714 (Blackmun concurring in part).
, See, for example, O'Lone v Estate of Shabazz, 482 US 342, 354 (1987) (Brennan
dissenting, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens) (completely barring religious cere-
mony in prison requires government to demonstrate "important" governmental interest). If
compelling "really means what it says," Smith, 110 S Ct at 1605, the test resembles that
proposed in Virginia by the young James Madison: that free exercise be protected "'unless
under color of religion the preservation of equal liberty and the existence of the State are
manifestly endangered.'" Sanford H. Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty in America 492
(Macmillan, 1902). This proposal was rejected, and no state adopted so strict a standard.
See McConnell, 103 Harv L Rev at 1463 (cited in note 24).
"' This is not, however, unique to the Free Exercise Clause. In most areas of constitu-
tional law, the Court's supposed "compelling interest test" falls far short of that. See, for
1990] 1127
The University of Chicago Law Review
But just because the test was not so strong as "compelling"
does not mean that the Court failed to apply heightened scrutiny
in its previous decisions. There is no support in the precedents for
the Court to replace the prior test with nothing more than the
toothless rationality review that is applicable to all legislation. As
explained in more detail below, a serious examination of the pur-
ported justifications for restricting religious exercise is necessary to
separate objective differences from prejudice. Rather than taking
the extreme step that it took, the Court should have recast the
"compelling interest" test in a more realistic form.
I favor returning to the standards articulated in state constitu-
tions at the time of the framing: repugnancy to the "peace and
safety of the State."' 0 Madison's formulation is also apt: that free
exercise should be protected "in every case where it does not tres-
pass on private rights or the public peace." 91 This means that we
are free to practice our religions so long as we do not injure others.
Modern scholars have also attempted to articulate a more accurate
test. Stephen Pepper poses the issue this way: "[I]s there a real,
tangible (palpable, concrete, measurable), non-speculative, non-
trivial injury to a legitimate, substantial state interest. ' 92 Judge
Richard Posner and I proposed that "[e]ffects on religious practice
must be minimized, and can be justified only on the basis of a de-
monstrable and unavoidable relation to public purposes unrelated
to the effects on religion."93 Any of these tests would achieve the
purposes of the Free Exercise Clause without rhetorical overkill.
example, Roberts v United States Jaycees, 468 US 609, 621-23 (1984) ("Jaycees chapters
lack the distinctive characteristics that might afford constitutional protection to the deci-
sion of its members to exclude women"; state's compelling interest in eradicating discrimi-
nation outweighs Jaycees' freedom of association); City of Richmond v J.A. Croson Co., 488
US 469 (1989) (city failed to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest justifying a
construction contract plan requiring that a percentage of work be subcontracted to "Minor-
ity Business Enterprises"). Admittedly, the free exercise cases may be the most extreme
example. See, for example, Justice Stevens's concurrence in Lee, in which he notes that the
justifications are so flimsy that the Court must not be applying the test. 455 US at 262-63
(Stevens concurring).
90 See the discussion of state free exercise provisions in McConnell, 103 Harv L Rev at
1461-66 (cited in note 24).
91 Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in Gaillard Hunt,
ed, 9 The Writings of James Madision 98, 100 (G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1901).
92 Stephen L. Pepper, The Conundrum of the Free Exercise Clause-Some Reflections
on Recent Cases, 9 N Ky L Rev 265, 289 (1982).
93 McConnell and Posner, 56 U Chi L Rev at 14 (cited in note 57). In another attempt,
I suggested that a law with the purpose or likely effect of increasing religious uniformity by
inhibiting the religious practice of the person or group challenging the law "will be permit-
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III. THE THEORETICAL ARGUMENT
Perhaps because of its purported reliance on precedent, the
Smith opinion does not present a sustained explanation of its the-
oretical underpinnings. Yet the opinion rests, in the end, not on
text or history or precedent, but on the majority's view, revealed in
a few key sentences in the opinion, of the proper relation between
law and religious conscience. It is unfortunate that Justice Scalia
wrote the opinion in this way, for while the argument based on
precedent is hopelessly contrived, the theoretical argument is seri-
ous and substantial, even if mistaken. It requires careful attention
and deserves a thorough response.
Virtually the entire theoretical argument of the Smith opinion
is packed into this one sentence:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the politi-
cal process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious
practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable
consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a
system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in
which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against
the centrality of all religious beliefs.94
The rhetoric of this sentence is certainly impolitic, leaving the
Court open to the charge of abandoning its traditional role as pro-
tector of minority rights against majoritarian oppression. The "dis-
advantaging" of minority religions is not "unavoidable" if the
courts are doing their job. Avoiding certain "consequences" of
democratic government is ordinarily thought to be the very pur-
pose of a Bill of Rights. But the argument reflected in this sen-
tence nonetheless contains ideas that cannot be dismissed so
lightly.
The Court's argument has a certain unity, but for purposes of
analysis I propose to break it up into five separate but related
ideas expressed in this sentence and a few other key passages in
the opinion. The first idea is an implied devaluation of the impor-
ted only if it is the least restrictive means for (a) protecting the private rights of others, or
(b) ensuring that the benefits and burdens of public life are equitably shared." Michael W.
McConnell, Taking Religion Seriously, First Things 30, 34 (May 1990). Readers troubled by
the fact that I have put forward two non-identical tests should be forewarned that before I
stop thinking about these things I shall probably come up with other tests.
94 110 S Ct at 1606.
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tance of denominational neutrality under the Religion Clauses.9
Second is the assumption that free exercise exemptions are a form
of special preference for religion and that generally applicable laws
written from the perspective of the majority are necessarily and by
definition neutral. Third is the claim that exceptions under the
Free Exercise Clause are a constitutional anomaly. Fourth is that
decisions regarding free exercise exemptions are inherently subjec-
tive and therefore legislative in character; in other words, courts
have no non-arbitrary way to adjudicate conflicts between religious
conscience and law. Fifth, and most important, is that it is con-
trary to the rule of law-it would be "courting anarchy" 96 -for in-
dividual conscience to take precedence over law.
A. Denominational Neutrality
The Smith opinion does not specifically address how one
should weigh the evils of disadvantaging religious minorities
against those of arbitrary judging and lawlessness. The outcome of
the case, however, implicitly suggests that denominational neutral-
ity is of secondary importance. The opinion characterizes the doc-
trine of free exercise exemptions as a "luxury, '97 suggesting that
its purposes, while worthy, are distinctly subordinate. Had this
proposition been raised explicitly, the Court would have found
much in our constitutional history bearing on the question and
might have found it more difficult to reach the balance it struck.
In Larson v Valente, the Court noted that the "clearest com-
mand of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomina-
tion cannot be officially preferred over another."98 This conclusion
is confirmed repeatedly in both statements and constitutional en-
actments of the founding period. Baptist leader John Leland pro-
posed an amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution forbid-
ding the legislature to "establish any religion by law, [or] give any
one sect a preference to another . . . . 9 In a similar vein, Jonas
Phillips, Revolutionary War patriot and founder of a synagogue in
Philadelphia, informed the Constitutional Convention by petition
that the Jews wished the Constitution to be framed so that "all
11 By "denominational neutrality" I mean neutrality among religions, but not necessar-
ly neutrality between religion and other belief systems.
96 110 S Ct at 1605.
97 Id.
99 456 US 228, 244 (1982).
99 L.F. Greene, ed, The Writings of the Late Elder John Leland 229 (G.W. Wood,
1845).
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Religious societies are on an Equal footing."' 00 Rhode Island's pro-
posed amendment to the federal Constitution asked that "no par-
ticular sect or society ought to be favored or established by law."''1 1
The twelve state constitutional free exercise provisions extant
in 1789 were different in many respects, but all contained language
referring to denominational equality (though in two states this
equality was extended only to Christian denominations). New York
and South Carolina both specified that the right of free exercise
was to be "without discrimination or preference,"'10 and Virginia
provided that "all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of
religion."' 03 Other states used words like "every," "all," "no,"
"equal," or "equally" to make the same point.'10 This idea carried
forward to the federal Constitution. Although the language did not
survive to the final version, Madison's initial draft of the Free Ex-
ercise Clause provided that "the full and equal rights of conscience
[shall not] be in any manner, nor on any pretext, infringed."' 05 The
words "full and equal" help to capture the demand for neutrality
among religions that imbued the movement for free exercise
protections.
Against this background, it seems the Supreme Court should
have given more serious attention to the problem of "plac[ing] at a
relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely
engaged in" before concluding that this consideration is out-
100 Letter from Jonas Phillips to the Federal Constitutional Convention (Sept 7, 1787),
reprinted in Morris U. Schappes, ed, A Documentary History of the Jews in the United
States 1654-1875 68, 69 (Citadel, 1950). The petition noted that "[i]t is well known among
all the Citizens of the 13 united states that the Jews have been true and faithful whigs, &
during the late Contest with England they have been foremost in aiding and assisting the
states with their lifes & fortunes, they have supported the cause, have bravely fought and
bled for liberty which they can not Enjoy."
301 Jonathan Elliot, 1 The Debates in the Several States on the Adoption of the Fed-
eral Constitution 334 (Taylor & Maury, 2d ed 1854).
101 NY Const of 1777, Art XXXVIII, reprinted in 2 Poore's at 1329, 1338 (cited in note
38); SC Const of 1790, Art VIII, § 1, reprinted in id at 1628, 1632-33.
103 Va Bill of Rights of 1776, § 16, reprinted in 2 Poore's at 1908-09 (cited in note 38).
'0 For numerous examples, see McConnell, 103 Harv L Rev 1456-57 & n 242 (cited in
note 24).
105 Joseph Gales, ed, 1 Annals of the Congress of the United States 434 (Madison,
June 8, 1789) (Gales and Seaton, 1834). Two printings exist of the first two volumes of the
Annals of Congress. They contain different pagination, running heads, and back titles. The
printing with the running head "History of Congress" conforms to the remaining volumes of
the series, while the printing with the running head "Gales & Seaton's history of debates in
Congress" is unique. This page citation is to the latter version; the corresponding reference
in the other volume can be found by using the date of Madison's proposal.
1990] 1131
The University of Chicago Law Review
weighed by other principles less firmly rooted in our constitutional
scheme. O6
Why did the majority feel it necessary to take this position?
The reason, I believe, arises not from concerns about the Free Ex-
ercise Clause but from concerns about the Establishment Clause.
Under the Smith Court's conception, courts will not be able to or-
der exceptions from laws of general applicability-but legislatures
will. Indeed, the Court declares such exemptions "desirable.' 10 7
The problem, as the Court candidly acknowledges, is that the po-
litical branches, being political, will tend to be most solicitous of
the value of familiar, popular, and socially acceptable religious
faiths. Prior to Smith, the Free Exercise Clause functioned as a
corrective for this bias, allowing the courts, which are institution-
ally more attuned to the interests of the less powerful segments of
society, to extend to minority religions the same degree of solici-
tude that more mainstream religions are able to attain through the
political process. The Free Exercise Clause, prior to Smith, was an
equalizer.
There is, however, an alternative equalizer: the Establishment
Clause. If the political branches enact accommodations that tend
to benefit mainstream more than fringe religions, the solution
could be to strike them down under the Establishment Clause.
Rather than ensuring that all religious faiths receive equal solici-
tude, the courts can ensure that all receive equal indifference. This
is the position of some secularists who take a strong position on
establishment and a weak position on free exercise. 0 8 It is evident
that the Smith majority prefers denominational inequality to an
Establishment Clause-driven policy of indifference. Indeed, from
the Court's perspective, an activist establishment jurisprudence is
no less objectionable than an activist free exercise jurisprudence.
Moreover, the establishment strategy would fail, even if it
were desirable. Accommodation can be accomplished by inaction
just as it can by action. In other words, the legislatures can simply
refrain from passing laws that burden the exercise of religion by
mainstream groups, and there is nothing the Establishment Clause
can do about this. In the end, the only hope for achieving denomi-
national neutrality is a vigorous Free Exercise Clause.
106 110 S Ct at 1606.
107 Id.
108 Justice Stevens is the closest example on the current Supreme Court. He alone has
consistently voted against free exercise and for establishment claims in divided cases in
recent years.
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B. Special Privileges or Neutrality in the Face of Differences?
Throughout the Smith opinion, generally applicable laws are
treated as presumptively neutral, with religious accommodations a
form of special preference, akin to affirmative action. The opinion
describes religious accommodations as laws that "affirmatively fos-
ter" the "value" of "religious belief."10 9 In Sherbert v Verner, by
contrast, Justice Brennan's majority opinion characterized a reli-
gious exemption as "reflect[ing] nothing more than the governmen-
tal obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences.'11°
In a sense, then, both Smith and Sherbert are about neutrality to-
ward religion. But which has the correct understanding of
neutrality?"
To examine this question, I will use the facts of Stansbury v
Marks, the first recorded case raising free exercise issues after
adoption of the First Amendment. 12 The case arose in the Penn-
sylvania courts and was decided under state law. The Reporter's
summary of the holding of the case was: "A Jew may be fined for
refusing to testify on his Sabbath." ' 3 The entire report of the case
is as follows:
In this cause (which was tried on Saturday, the 5th of April),
the defendant offered Jonas Phillips, a Jew, as a witness; but
he refused to be sworn, because it was his Sabbath. The court,
therefore, fined him 101.; but the defendant, afterwards, waiv-
ing the benefit of his testimony, he was discharged from the
fine. 114
We can assume that, in those days of the six-day work week, the
courts of Pennsylvania were routinely open for business on Satur-
day. The decision to operate on Saturday, we may assume, was not
aimed at members of the Jewish faith, but was simply a matter of
convenience. Nor was the law allowing parties to civil suits to com-
10* 110 S Ct at 1606.
110 374 US 398, 409 (1963).
"I For more detailed discussion of these two understandings of neutrality, see McCon-
nell, 103 Harv L Rev at 1419-20 (cited in note 24); Douglas C. Laycock, Formal, Substan-
tive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DePaul L Rev 993 (1990).
1,2 2 US 213 (1793). I use Stansbury for its facts; as is evident from my discussion, I
think this case was wrongly decided. The case has been cited only once in a reported Su-
preme Court opinion, Justice Frankfurter's dissent in West Virginia State Board of Educa-
tion v Barnette, 319 US 624, 655 (1943) (Frankfurter dissenting) (citing, inter alia, Stans-
bury for proposition that general requirement of flag salute is not first instance of requiring
obedience to laws that "offend[] deep religious scruples").
113 2 US 213.
114 Id.
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pel witnesses to attend court proceedings, on pain of paying a fine,
instituted for the purpose of restricting religious exercise. This is
an example of a generally applicable, otherwise valid, law. Is it
neutral toward religion?
No, it is not. The courts were closed on Sundays, the day on
which the Christian majority of Pennsylvania observed the sab-
bath. The effect of the six-day calendar was to impose a burden on
Saturday sabbath observers (mostly Jews) that is not imposed on
others (mostly Christians). It is anything but neutral-not because
the burden happened to fall disproportionately on Jews, but be-
cause the burden was attached to a practice that, among others,
defines what it means to be a faithful Jew.
What would neutrality require? Surely it is not necessary to
conduct court business on Sunday. Since the vast majority of
Pennsylvanians were Christians and observed Sunday as the day of
sabbath, that would create needless conflict and administrative
costs. It would be more neutral to close on both Saturday and Sun-
day, the modern solution, but that has significant costs in an era of
a six-day work week. And if there were other religious minorities in
the Commonwealth who observed the sabbath on other days, Mos-
lems perhaps, then this solution would not work at all. The best,
least costly, and most neutral solution is to exempt Saturday sab-
bath observers from the obligation of testifying on Saturday. Thus,
an exemption is not "affirmative fostering" of religion; it is more
like Sherbert's neutrality in the face of differences.
It may be objected that this example is loaded because the
selection of days of rest is fraught with religious significance. The
selection of Sunday as the day on which the courts would not oper-
ate was itself a religious choice, almost an establishment of the
Christian religion. It might be said that an exemption is required
in that case only to equalize a situation in which Christians had
already been granted a benefit on account of religious practice.
But this objection presupposes that there are decisions that
are not fraught with religious significance. And perhaps there
are-but those decisions will not give rise to free exercise claims.
All free exercise claims involve government decisions that are
fraught with religious significance, at least from the point of view
of the religious minority. In this respect, Stansbury v Marks can-
not be distinguished from Smith. In Smith, the generally applica-
ble law was the prohibition on the use of hallucinogenic drugs. The
Native American Church uses peyote as its sacrament. Application
of the anti-drug laws to the sacramental use of peyote effectively
destroys the practice of the Native American Church. Is this
neutral?
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No, it is not. Christians and Jews use wine as part of their
sacrament, and wine is not illegal. Even when wine was illegal dur-
ing Prohibition, Congress exempted the sacramental use of wine
from the proscription. The effect of laws prohibiting hallucinogenic
drugs but not alcohol, or of allowing exemptions from one law but
not the other, is to impose a burden on the practice of the Native
American Church that is not imposed on Christians or Jews. It is
no more neutral than operating courts on Saturday and not on
Sunday.
But perhaps this overstates the case. Whether to operate
courts on Saturday or Sunday is clearly a decision involving com-
mensurables. Hallucinogenic drugs are far more dangerous than
wine. The difference in treatment can be said to be based on objec-
tive differences between the effects of the two substances. But is
this true? Evidence in the Smith case showed that ingestion of pe-
yote by members of the Native American Church is not dangerous
and does not lead to drug problems or substance abuse. Indeed, it
is statistically and culturally associated with resistance to sub-
stance abuse.'"e The federal government and twenty-three of the
states have approved the use of peyote in Native American Church
ceremonies for this reason, and the federal government even li-
censes a facility for the production of peyote.
If this evidence is valid, then the decision to ban the sacra-
mental use of peyote but not the sacramental use of wine is not
based on any objective differences between the effects of the two
substances. Rather, it is based on the fact that most ordinary
Americans are familiar with the use of wine and consider Christian
and Jewish sacramental use harmless and perhaps even a good
thing; but the same ordinary Americans consider peyote a bizarre
and threatening substance and have no respect or solicitude for the
Native American Church. In short, the difference is attributable to
prejudice.
The only way to tell whether the difference in treatment be-
tween peyote and wine is the result of prejudice or the result of
objective differences in the substances is to examine closely the
purported governmental purpose. If the purpose is important, and
if the means are closely related to the purpose, then the policy is
probably based on objective differences. If the purpose is weak or
the means only loosely related to the purpose, then the policy is
115 See text at note 17.
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more likely the result of prejudice. This, of course, is a rough
description of the compelling interest test. That test, therefore, is
not a form of "affirmative[] foster[ing]" of religion.116 It is a way to
determine whether government decisions that interfere with the
religious exercise of religious minorities are in fact neutral.
It should be apparent why a mere absence of attention to reli-
gious consequences on the part of the legislature cannot prove that
legislation is neutral. In a world in which some beliefs are more
prominent than others, the political branches will inevitably be se-
lectively sensitive toward religious injuries. Laws that impinge
upon the religious practices of larger or more prominent faiths will
be noticed and remedied. When the laws impinge upon the prac-
tice of smaller groups, legislators will not even notice, and may not
care even if they do notice. If believers of all creeds are to be pro-
tected in the "full and equal rights of conscience," then selective
sensitivity is not enough.117 The courts offer a forum in which the
particular infringements of small religions can be brought to the
attention of the authorities and (assuming the judges perform their
duties impartially) be given the same sort of hearing that more
prominent religions already receive from the political process." 8
116 110 S Ct at 1606.
117 Professor Mark Tushnet has argued that the effects of government action are un-
likely to bear more heavily on minority religions: "In a pluralistic society with crosscutting
group memberships, the overall distribution of benefits and burdens is likely to be reasona-
bly fair." Tushnet, 76 Georgetown L J at 1700 (cited in note 1). As an empirical assessment,
this claim seems wildly off the mark. Most legislators are unaware of the problems of minor-
ity religions, and many (though not all) minority religions are poorly positioned to defend
their own interests.
118 Professor Tushnet has also criticized the compelling interest test on the ground that
it is weighted in favor of "mainstream" religious claims, largely because judges are more
likely to deem such claims "sincere." Tushnet, 1989 S Ct Rev at 382-83 (cited in note 1).
Indeed, Tushnet states: "[P]ut bluntly, the pattern is that sometimes Christians win but
non-Christians never do." Id at 381. While I share Tushnet's pessimistic assessment of a
number of Supreme Court decisions rejecting strong free exercise claims on the part of non-
Christian claimants, I do not share his diagnosis. It would be more accurate to state that
non-Christians never win, and Christians almost never win, either. The insensitivity about
which Tushnet complains is virtually indiscriminate, suggesting not so much a preference
for mainstream religions as a blindness toward nonsecular concerns.
Indeed, although the number of winning claims is so small that there can be no statisti-
cal verification, the claims of "non-mainstream" groups seem to enjoy something of an ad-
vantage in free exercise litigation, because judges are less likely to second-guess their claims
about the needs of their religious practice. Judges are notoriously unwilling to accept the
possibility that sects made up of otherwise ordinary Americans might entertain religious
convictions that are out of the ordinary. See, for example, Mozert v Hawkins County Board
of Education, 827 F2d 1058 (6th Cir 1987) (court unable to comprehend how exposure to
certain public school curriculum could burden religious beliefs of fundamentalists). The
more obviously "different" religions-like the Hare Krishnas or the Amish-are less likely
to encounter this problem.
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C. Constitutional Anomalies
Closely related to the preceding point is the Smith Court's
claim that the compelling interest test in free exercise exemption
cases is "a constitutional anomaly."119 According to the Court, use
of the compelling interest test in cases of racial discrimination or
content-based speech regulation
is not remotely comparable to using it for the purpose as-
serted here. What it produces in those other fields-equality
of treatment, and an unrestricted flow of contending
speech-are constitutional norms; what it would produce
here-a private right to ignore generally applicable laws-is a
constitutional anomaly. 120
Drawing on analogies from several other fields of constitutional
law, including freedom of the press, disproportionate impact cases
under the Equal Protection Clause, and content-neutral restric-
tions on speech, the Court concluded that "the only approach
compatible with these precedents" is to hold that "generally appli-
cable, religion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a par-
ticular religious practice need not be justified by a compelling
governmental interest.' 2'1
It is far from clear what is wrong with the Free Exercise
Clause being a "constitutional anomaly." Different clauses of the
Constitution perform different functions and have different logical
structures. It is hard to see how precedents drawn from other areas
of constitutional law can have the effect of foreclosing any particu-
lar interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. The Free Exercise
Clause is framed in terms of a substantive liberty; there is no rea-
son to expect it to have the same logic as the Equal Protection
Clause. Nonetheless, if the Free Exercise Clause were the only pro-
vision of the Constitution that required exceptions from generally
applicable laws, this might give cause for reexamination. But it
isn't.
The language of exemptions, exceptions, or accommodations is
largely confined to free exercise cases, but other fields have their
In any event, the question is one of relative competence. However deficient judges may
be, their institutional responsibilities incline them to take seriously the claims of under-
represented groups. It is difficult to see how the position of non-mainstream religions is
improved by relegating them to political remedies.
"1 110 S Ct at 1604.
120 Id.
"I Id at 1604 n 3.
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equivalents. For example, the concept of an "as applied" challenge
to a law is a precise parallel.122 The law remains in force as to most
applications, but an exception is carved out for those to whom its
application, under their particular circumstances, would be a con-
stitutional violation. That this means that some citizens are ex-
empt from laws applied to other citizens has never been thought
illegitimate in other constitutional contexts.
In particular, and contrary to the Smith opinion,123 exceptions
from generally applicable laws are an established part of the pro-
tections for free speech and press under the First Amendment. In-
deed, the very core of the free press clause-the freedom from
prior restraints-can be seen as an exemption from a form of regu-
lation that can be applied to virtually every other commercial busi-
ness. To be sure, as the court points out, antitrust and labor laws
have been applied to the press without First Amendment diffi-
culty.124 But that is because such laws pose no special problems for
the press. As the Court put it in one press case, "[t]he regulation
here in question has no relation whatever to the impartial distribu-
tion of news. 1 25 For the same reason, fire and safety (and a host of
other) regulations can be applied to churches. But when the regu-
lations in question do have a substantial impact on the press or on
religion, they raise a serious claim for exemption.
In free speech cases involving regulations not specifically di-
rected at speech (the equivalent to generally applicable laws not
specifically directed at religion), the Court has reached a doctrinal
conclusion similar to that in the pre-Smith cases. In the leading
case, United States v O'Brien, the Court held that a regulation
that has the effect of restricting speech even though the govern-
mental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression
can be enforced only "if it furthers an important or substantial
"I See, for example, Bowen v Kendrick, 487 US 589 (1988) (Adolescent Family Life Act
held not to be a facial violation of Establishment Clause; "as applied" challenge remanded
for additional fact-finding); United States v Salerno, 481 US 739 (1987) (pretrial detention
authorized by Bail Reform Act not a facial violation of Eighth Amendment); Brown v So-
cialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 459 US 87 (1982) (campaign disclosure laws held
to be facially valid, but invalid as applied to minor party where disclosure would likely
subject contributors to harassment).
123 The Smith Court asserted that "generally applicable laws unconcerned with regulat-
ing speech that have the effect of interfering with speech do not thereby become subject to
compelling-interest analysis under the First Amendment." 110 S Ct at 1604 n 3 (emphasis in
original) (citations omitted).
124 Citizen Publishing Co. v United States, 394 US 131, 139 (1969) (antitrust); Associ-
ated Press v NLRB, 301 US 103 (1937) (labor). The Smith Court cites Citizen Publishing at
110 S Ct at 1600.
125 Associated Press, 301 US at 133.
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governmental interest" and "if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest." 12 6 This approach is virtually identical
to the free exercise exemptions test, once it is stripped of over-
blown language about "compelling" interests.127 More recently, the
Court has stated that generally applicable ("incidental") restric-
tions that have a highly disproportionate impact on persons en-
gaged in First Amendment activity trigger First Amendment scru-
tiny."2 This, too, is parallel to the theory rejected in Smith: the
anti-drug law has a highly disproportionate impact on practitioners
of the Native American Church because it makes their central reli-
gious activity illegal.
The Smith opinion also draws an analogy to "race-neutral
laws that have the effect of disproportionately disadvantaging a
particular racial group, 1 29 noting that such laws "do not thereby
become subject to compelling-interest analysis under the Equal
Protection Clause." 130 This is true, but the difference in doctrinal
analysis is rooted in the nature of the underlying constitutional
principles.131
At the risk of oversimplification, it can be said that the ideal
of racial nondiscrimination is that individuals are fundamentally
equal and must be treated as such; differences based on race are
irrelevant and must be overcome. The ideal of free exercise of reli-
gion, by contrast, is that people of different religious convictions
are different and that those differences are precious and must not
be disturbed. The ideal of racial justice is assimilationist and inte-
grationist.13 2 The ideal of free exercise is counter-assimilationist; it
strives to allow individuals of different religious faiths to maintain
their differences in the face of powerful pressures to conform.
126 391 US 367, 377 (1968).
22 Interestingly, prior to O'Brien the Court had used the language of "compelling" in-
terests in the context of regulations not directed at speech, but in O'Brien settled on the less
extreme language of "important or substantial." Id at 377. Perhaps free exercise doctrine
would have been less susceptible to the sort of attack it suffered in Smith if it had earlier
undergone a similar rhetorical deflation. See text at note 94.
128 Arcara v Cloud Books, Inc., 478 US 697, 703-04 (1986).
129 110 S Ct at 1604 n 3 (emphasis in original).
130 Id, citing Washington v Davis, 426 US 229 (1976).
131 See also Geoffrey R. Stone, Constitutionally Compelled Exemptions and the Free
Exercise Clause, 27 Wm & Mary L Rev 985, 986-94 (1986) (comparing free .exercise exemp-
tion with free speech and equal protection doctrine).
132 I do not overlook the fact that there is a significant competing understanding of
racial justice that is nonintegrationist and seeks to preserve and emphasize racial solidarity.
But that competing understanding rejects Washington v Davis and thus provides no sup-
port for the Smith Court's portrayal of exemptions as constitutional anomalies.
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A better analogy can be drawn between free exercise theory
and the theory of handicap discrimination, which is quite different
from race discrimination. The theory of handicap discrimination
recognizes that individuals with a handicap are different in a way
that cannot be changed but can only be accommodated. Failure to
install a low-cost ramp for access to a building, for example, is a
core violation of the norms of handicap discrimination theory-
even though a rampless building was presumably not constructed
for the purpose of exclusion. Religion is more like handicap than it
is like race. A person who cannot work on Saturday is not merely
disproportionately disadvantaged by a requirement that he accept
"suitable" work (where "suitable" is defined in secular terms); he
is excluded precisely on account of his "difference," as surely as
the wheelchair-bound person is from a rampless building. By con-
trast, the black job applicant in Washington v Davis was not ex-
cluded on account of his "difference," but on account of a factor
that under the ideal vision of racial justice is wholly unrelated to
his "difference." If the paradigmatic instance of race discrimina-
tion is treating people who are fundamentally the same as if they
were different, the paradigmatic instance of free exercise violations
or handicap discrimination is treating people who are fundamen-
tally different as if they were the same.133
Based on these analogies, to which others could be added,3
the free exercise exemptions doctrine is not a constitutional anom-
aly.13 5 It is parallel to doctrines under the free speech and press
provisions, and while it is different from the doctrine of race-
133 It is significant that in devising standards for discrimination, Congress used an iden-
tical formulation-reasonable accommodation-when describing the obligations with re-
spect to religion and handicap, while using language of equal treatment when describing the
obligations with respect to race. See Title VII, 42 USC § 2000e (1982), for religion, and the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub L No 101-336 § 101(3), 104 Stat 327 (1990), to
be codified at 42 USC § 12111, for handicap.
I" Other constitutional doctrines, not mentioned in Smith, can require exceptions from
generally applicable laws. See, for example, negative Commerce Clause (see American
Trucking Ass'ns v Scheiner, 483 US 266 (1987) (generally applicable lump-sum annual tax
on trucks held to discriminate against interstate carriers)); freedom of association (see
NAACP v Alabama, 357 US 449 (1958) (state statute requiring foreign corporations to make
certain disclosures to qualify for doing business could not be applied to require NAACP to
disclose membership lists)); Speech or Debate Clause (members of Congress have privileges
and immunities from various laws during attendance in Congress and going to or returning
from sessions).
'3" Robert Nagel has observed that a wide array of constitutional doctrines follow the
compelling interest model. Robert F. Nagel, Constitutional Cultures: The Mentality and
Consequences of Judicial Review 106-108 (Berkeley, 1989). Nagel, like the Smith majority,
is critical of this analytical approach. But unlike the Court, he sees it as all too common and
not as anomalous.
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neutral laws with a disproportionate impact, that difference follows
from the theories underlying race discrimination and free exercise.
D. The Judicial Role
A major theme of the Smith opinion is that the compelling
interest test forces the courts to engage in judgments that cannot
be made on a nonarbitrary basis. The Court commented that "it is
horrible to contemplate that federal judges will regularly balance
against the importance of general laws the significance of religious
practice."1 6 It is better that minority religions will be at "a rela-
tive disadvantage," the Court said, than that judges have to "weigh
the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all reli-
gious beliefs. '13 7
The Court illustrated this concern with what it playfully ad-
mitted to be a "parade of horribles"-claims for free exercise ex-
emptions from such laws as compulsory military service, health
and safety regulation, compulsory vaccination laws, traffic laws,
and social welfare legislation including minimum wage, child labor,
and animal cruelty laws.138 Putting aside the fact that many of the
Court's "horribles" are far from horrible,13 9 and that some of its
"horribles" involve anti-religious discrimination and thus are unaf-
fected by the Smith holding, 140 this parade is almost risible in its
"1 110 S Ct at 1606 n 5.
137 Id at 1606.
136 Id at 1605.
131 Why should it be thought troubling that a religious community in which members
work without pay out of religious convictions be exempted from the minimum wage laws?
See Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v Secretary of Labor, 471 US 290 (1985), cited by
Smith, 110 S Ct at 1605. Isn't it a bit ridiculous to apply child labor laws to a girl passing
out religious tracts in the company of her aunt? See Prince v Massachusetts, 321 US 158
(1944), cited at 110 S Ct at 1605. And why shouldn't a private university that receives no
federal funds be able to forbid interracial dating among its students on religious grounds
without forfeiting its tax exempt status? See Bob Jones University v United States, 461 US
574 (1983), cited at 110 S Ct at 1606. Far from suggesting that free exercise claims are
outlandish, these examples suggest that the courts have been far too parsimonious in up-
holding them.
110 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v City of Hialeah, 723 F Supp 1467 (S D
Fla 1989), cited by Smith at 110 S Ct at 1605, involves a city ordinance that prohibits the
"ritual slaughter" of animals. The city permits the slaughter of animals, no matter how
cruelly, if done for any other reason, including pest control, food, or sport. This sort of law,
aimed specifically at the religious practice of a small and unpopular racial and religious
minority, should presumably be unconstitutional even after Smith. That the Supreme Court
would include this case in its parade of horribles while the case is on appeal is particularly
troubling on due process grounds given that the reference might well prejudice the case in
the appellate court. Indeed, the appellee quoted the Smith dictum prominently in its brief.
See id, No 90-5176, Brief of Appellee-Defendant City of Hialeah at 19, 28, 29 (11th Cir). (I
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one-sidedness. For every claim that would, if granted, produce a
horrible result, there is a claim that ought to be granted but will
not be after the Smith decision.
Consider the fact that employment discrimination laws could
force the Roman Catholic Church to hire female priests, if there
are no free exercise exemptions from generally applicable laws."'
Or that historic preservation laws could prevent churches from
making theologically significant alterations to their structures. 142
Or that prisons will not have to serve kosher or hallel food to Jew-
ish or Moslem prisoners.1 43 Or that Jewish high school athletes
may be forbidden to wear yarmulkes and thus excluded from inter-
scholastic sports.1 44 Or that churches with a religious objection to
unrepentant homosexuality will be required to retain an openly
gay individual as church organist, 45 parochial school teacher,4 or
even a pastor. Or that public school students will be forced to at-
filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the church's position, on behalf of the Baptist
Joint Committee, the Rutherford Institute, and the Christian Legal Society.)
141 Title VII, 42 USC § 2000e (1982), contains no exception for religious bodies, al-
though it is possible that the church might be able to prove that gender is a bona fide
occupational characteristic under the statute. (It is interesting to contemplate how a secular
court would approach such a question of ecclesiastical practice, since deference to the em-
ployer would be entirely out of keeping with the allocation of burdens of proof under Title
VII.) In employment discrimination cases prior to Smith, the courts uniformly held that the
Free Exercise Clause exempts religious organizations with respect to positions of religious
significance. See, for example, Rayburn v General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists,
772 F2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir 1985); McClure v Salvation Army, 460 F2d 553, 558-59 (5th Cir
1972); EEOC v Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F2d 277, 285-86 (5th Cir
1981).
14 See First Covenant Church v City of Seattle, 114 Wash 2d 392, 787 P2d 1352 (1990)
(en banc) (government regulation of exterior of church held unconstitutional); Society of
Jesus v Boston Landmarks Comm., Nos 87-3168, 87-4571, 87-6586, slip op (Mass Super,
Nov 2, 1989) (government regulation of the placement of church altars held unconstitutional
under the Free Exercise Clause). For an excellent discussion of the constitutional issues, see
Angela C. Carmella, Houses of Worship and Religious Liberty: Constitutional Limits to
Landmark Preservation and Architectural Review, 36 Vill L Rev - (forthcoming 1991).
1'3 Prior to Smith, the federal courts frequently required the prisons to make reasona-
ble accommodations to the religious dietary needs of prisoners. See Hunafa v Murphy, 907
F2d 46 (7th Cir 1990) (upholding Muslim prisoner's right to receive food uncontaminated by
pork and remanding for factfinding on governmental interest; the court noted that prison
officials may raise the intervening Smith decision on remand and that this may eliminate
the free exercise claim). See also McElyea v Babbitt, 833 F2d 196, 198 (9th Cir 1987) (per
curiam); Kahane v Carlson, 527 F2d 492, 495 (2d Cir 1975).
144 See Menora v Illinois High School Ass'n, 683 F2d 1030 (7th Cir 1982).
141 Walker v First Presbyterian Church, 22 FEP Cases (BNA) 762 (Cal S Ct 1980)
(holding that Free Exercise Clause bars application of local gay rights ordinance to employ-
ment of church organist).
1"I Lewis ex rel Murphy v Buchanan, 21 FEP Cases (BNA) 696 (D Minn 1979) (same,
as applied to parochial school teacher).
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tend sex education classes contrary to their faith.147 Or that reli-
gious sermons on issues of political significance could lead to revo-
cation of tax exemptions. 14 8 Or that Catholic doctors in public
hospitals could be fired if they refuse to perform abortions. 49 Or
that Orthodox Jews could be required to cease and desist from sex-
ual segregation of their places of worship.150
If the Court wishes to consider a parade of horribles, it should
parade the horribles on both sides. But while the two parades may
be of the same length, they are of very different quality. The judi-
cial system is able to reject claims that would be horrible if
granted; believers are helpless to deal with infringements on reli-
gious freedom that the courts refuse to remedy.
Challenged by Justice O'Connor's rejoinder that the parade of
horribles only "demonstrates... that courts have been quite capa-
ble of ... strik[ing] sensible balances between religious liberty and
competing state interests,'' the Court retreated to the proposi-
tion that "the purpose of our parade . . . is not to suggest that
courts would necessarily permit harmful exemptions from these
laws (though they might), but to suggest that courts would con-
stantly be in the business of determining whether the 'severe im-
pact' of various laws on religious practice ... suffices to permit us
to confer an exemption. "152
The Court's evident hostility to subjective judicial second-
guessing of legislative judgments is generally salutary, at least if
14' Prior to Smith, the courts generally concluded that the Free Exercise Clause re-
quires that students be excused from sex education classes contrary to their faith. See, for
example, Smith v Ricci, 89 NJ 514, 446 A2d 501 (1982); Medeiros v Kiyosaki, 52 Hawaii
436, 478 P2d 314 (1970). It is possible that these exemptions will survive Smith on the
ground that they are "hybrid" claims involving the rights of parents to control their chil-
dren's education. See text at notes 52-55.
'4" Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v United States, 470 F2d 849 (10th Cir
1972). Compare United States Catholic Conference v Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc.,
487 US 72 (1988) (lawsuit by ideological opponents of the Roman Catholic Church to force
the IRS to revoke the Church's tax exempt status because of its teaching against abortion
rights).
14 Most states protect the right of medical personnel to refuse to assist in abortions,
see, for example, Kenny v Ambulatory Centre of Miami, 400 S2d 1262 (Fla App 1981), but
prior to Smith this would also seem to have been a constitutional right.
"' The ordinance at issue in Roberts v United States Jaycees, 468 US 609 (1984), pro-
hibited sex discrimination in any "place of public accommodation," a term that could be
interpreted to include a synagogue. The Court suggested that an exemption would be re-
quired for religious associations. Id at 618. Because this involves freedom of speech and
association, it is possible that it would be considered a "hybrid" and thus protected even
after Smith.
Smith, 110 S Ct at 1612 (O'Connor concurring).
152 Id at 1606 n 5.
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not taken to extremes. But it raises the question: Why is the Free
Exercise Clause a particular target? The author of the Smith opin-
ion, Justice Scalia, is reasonably consistent regarding the undesir-
ability of judicial discretion.15 In most areas of constitutional law,
however, the majority of the Court does not hesitate to weigh the
social importance of laws against their impact on constitutional
rights. There is no particular reason to believe that judgments
under the Free Exercise Clause are any more discretionary or
prone to judicial abuse than judgments under the Commerce
Clause, the Due Process Clause, or the Free Speech Clause, to take
a few examples from the current catalog of compelling interest or
balancing tests. Unless Smith is the harbinger of a wholesale re-
treat from judicial discretion across the range of constitutional law,
there should be some explanation of why the problem in this field
is more acute than it is elsewhere.
The Smith opinion suggests that the problem with the com-
pelling interest test is that it requires inquiry into whether reli-
gious beliefs are "central" to the claimant's religion,5 which is
"akin to the unacceptable 'business of evaluating the relative mer-
its of differing religious claims.' " But is this true? In such cases,
the court is not judging the "merits" of religious claims but solely
trying to determine what they are. To be sure, the court may get it
wrong, but what is the grave injury from that (other than the im-
pact on the case itself)? The court does not purport to be resolving
issues of religious interpretation for any purpose other than under-
standing the nature of the plaintiff's claim, and its misinterpreta-
tion carries no weight beyond the courtroom. I agree that courts
must be sensitive to the impropriety of second-guessing religious
doctrine, but I cannot agree that the possibility of error warrants
abandonment of the enterprise.
Even so, Justice Scalia's opinion rightly calls attention to the
arbitrariness of judicial balancing under the prior compelling inter-
est test. The opinion is correct that the doctrine was poorly devel-
oped and unacceptably subjective. But the opinion proposes to
solve this problem by eliminating the doctrine of free exercise ex-
emptions rather than by contributing to the development of a
more principled approach. In my judgment, the theory of the Free
Exercise Clause (as opposed to its application) offers a principled
163 See, for example, Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U Chi L
Rev 1175 (1989).
"5 110 S Ct at 1604.
110 S Ct at 1604, quoting Lee, 455 US at 263 n 2 (Stevens concurring).
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basis for decision in cases of conflict between law and religious
conscience. Judges are not forced into the sort of free-wheeling bal-
ancing of incommensurate interests that the majority feared in
Smith. To be sure, there are hard cases, as there are under any
constitutional provision. But there are also easy cases-cases that
can be decided without any case-specific balancing whatso-
ever-and the principles constrain judicial discretion. Indeed, in
most free exercise cases no "balancing" is required at all, because
the relevant factors are ones of kind rather than of degree.
First, the history of the free exercise principle shows that gov-
ernmental interests do not extend to protecting the members of
the religious community from the consequences of their religious
choices. Both the evangelical advocates of religious freedom and
the Enlightenment liberals agreed that the "legitimate powers of
government extend only to punish men for working ill to their
neighbors." 158 The common pattern of state free exercise provi-
sions prior to 1789 protected religious exercise only to the extent
consistent with public "peace" and "safety.' 1 57 As Madison sum-
marized the point, free exercise should prevail "in every case where
it does not trespass on private rights or the public peace."''
Where the putative injury is internal to the religious community,
the government generally has no power to intervene, with the nar-
row exception of injury to children.15 9
Under this standard, the unanimous decision in Alamo Foun-
dation v Secretary of Labor 60 was mistaken. Minimum wage and
maximum hour laws are legitimate social legislation to protect
workers from exploitation by employers. But if members of the
Alamo religious movement are inspired to work for the glory of
God for long hours at no pay, their neighbors are not injured and
the government has no legitimate power to intervene. Religions
158 Greene, ed, The Writings of the Late Elder John Leland at 118 (cited in note 99).
Jefferson similarly stated that "[t]he legitimate powers of government extend to such acts
only as are injurious to others." Thomas Jefferson, Query XVII Religion, in William Peden,
ed, Notes on the State of Virginia 157, 159 (North Carolina, 1955).
1'" See text at notes 39, 91, and 92. See also McConnell, 103 Harv at 1461-64 (cited in
note 24).
568 Hunt, ed, 9 The Writings of James Madison at 100 (cited in note 91).
151 This principle can be understood in terms of the economic concept of externalities.
Where the government is preventing the imposition of negative externalities, its interest
generally overrides free exercise claims, but otherwise (except in special circumstances) it
does not. For an elaboration, see McConnell and Posner, 56 U Chi L Rev at 46 (cited in note
57).
Igo 471 US 290 (1985). I was the principal author of the Secretary's brief in Alamo
Foundation but, as is apparent from the text, my position here is not the same.
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often require sacrifice that outsiders may deem to be excessive.
Similarly, under this standard Amish farmers should not be com-
pelled to participate in the government-sponsored social security
system when they believe that support for the aged is the exclusive
responsibility of the religious community. The unanimous Su-
preme Court decision to the contrary, United States v Lee, 161 was
mistaken.
Most controversially, for a religious school to prohibit inter-
racial dating among its students is morally repugnant to most of
us, but its direct effects are purely internal to the religious group;
only those who choose to become part of the religious community
defined by Bob Jones are governed by its rules. It might be argued
that racist or other antisocial practices of religious groups affect
outsiders by their influence on the climate of opinion. By forbid-
ding interracial dating, for example, Bob Jones University might
foster the belief that the white and black races are fundamentally
unequal, to the injury of individuals who have neither joined nor
consented to Bob Jones's policies. But this argument implies that
religious conduct must be regulated because of its communicative
impact. Even apart from the Free Exercise Clause, the Free Speech
Clause disallows prohibition of conduct where the government's
sole purpose is to prevent the spread of offensive ideas. 62 If the
government cannot restrain so-minded persons from advocating ra-
cist ideas, it should not be able to restrain otherwise protected reli-
gious conduct on the ground that it will communicate racist ideas.
Once again, a unanimous Supreme Court reached the opposite
conclusion.' 63
A second principle that emerges from the theory of the Free
Exercise Clause is that the government is not required to create
exemptions that would make religious believers better off relative
to others than they would be in the absence of the government
program to which they object. The purpose of free exercise exemp-
tions is to ensure that incentives to practice a religion are not ad-
versely affected by government action. By the same token, govern-
161 455 US 252 (1982).
16. United States v Eichman, 110 S Ct 2404 (1990).
... Bob Jones University v United States, 461 US 574 (1983). Justice Rehnquist dis-
sented on statutory grounds, but joined in the majority's rejection of the free exercise claim.
To be sure, Bob Jones involved tax exemptions rather than a direct prohibition, thus intro-
ducing an unconstitutional conditions element to the analysis. Bob Jones is thus structur-
ally similar to a case in which a nonprofit advocacy group is denied tax exempt status on the
ground that it burns the American flag at its meetings.
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ment action should not have the effect of creating incentives to
practice religion.
This principle, too, allows some free exercise cases to be easily
decided without the need for ad hoc balancing. An example is Her-
nandez v Commissioner, in which the Court correctly rejected a
claim that denial of an income tax deduction for the expenses of a
religious practice violated the free exercise of religion. 64 In the ab-
sence of an income tax, the believer would bear the full cost of his
religious exercise. With an income tax and with deductibility, a
portion of the cost of the religious exercise is shifted from the be-
liever to the state. This leaves the believer better off, relative to
nonbelievers, than he would be with no income tax at all.16 5
A third principle is that the claims of minority religions
should receive the same consideration under the Free Exercise
Clause that the claims of mainstream religions receive in the politi-
cal process. This follows from the principle of denominational neu-
trality discussed above. To a great extent, the advocates of reli-
gious freedom at the time of the founding believed that minority
religions would be adequately secured in their rights so long as
they were on the "same footing" as the mainstream faiths. To
achieve equal rights of conscience, the courts should frame the free
exercise inquiry as follows: Is the governmental interest so impor-
tant that the government would impose a burden of this magni-
tude on the majority in order to achieve it?
A practical example can be found in an early New York case,
People v Philips.6 6 The question was whether a Roman Catholic
priest could be compelled to testify in court regarding a matter
divulged to him in the confessional. The New York City court, pre-
sided over by DeWitt Clinton, sometime governor of New York
and candidate for president of the United States, held that the free
exercise provision of the New York Constitution exempted the
priest from testifying. After noting that requiring testimony would
annihilate the sacramental practice of penance, the court com-
pared the matter to restrictions on Protestants.167 Although Prot-
estants did not practice auricular confession, and thus had no need
of this particular form of accommodation, the court stated that
' 109 S Ct 2136 (1989).
"' The taxpayer in Hernandez also claimed that the government engaged in denomina-
tional discrimination in its treatment of tax deductions. Id at 2146. This claim, unlike the
claim discussed in text, was meritorious and should not have been rejected by the Court.
"' The case is reprinted in William Sampson, The Catholic Question in America 5
(Gillespy, 1813) (reprinted in 1974 by Da Capo Press).
167 Id at 38.
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"[e]very man who hears me will answer in the affirmative" that a
law of the state that prevented administration of one of the Prot-
estant sacraments would be unconstitutional. 6 8
Thus, the exemption was required in order to maintain neu-
trality between the Protestant majority and the Catholic minority.
Neutrality did not mean treating them the same way; that would
have resulted in grave injustice to the Catholics. Rather, the court
posed and answered the hypothetical question: Is the government's
interest in compelling testimony so strong that it would interfere
with a Protestant sacrament in order to achieve it? The Catholic is
entitled to no less protection.
Under this principle, a court faced with a free exercise claim is
not required to determine, in the abstract, how important a gov-
ernmental purpose is or how central a religious practice is. The
court instead must engage in the hypothetical exercise of compar-
ing burdens. The degree of protection for religious minorities
should be no less than that which our society would provide for the
majority. This should be enough to decide many cases quite easily.
Who can doubt that unobtrusive exceptions to military uniform
regulations would be made if Christians, like Orthodox Jews, had
to wear yarmulkes at all times?6 9 Who can doubt that there would
be exceptions to social security (or, more likely, no social security
at all) if mainstream Christians were forbidden by their religion to
participate? °70 Who can doubt that the United States Forest Serv-
ice would find a way to avoid despoiling Christian worship sites
when building logging roads?' 7 '
Other cases would come out the other way. A country could
probably not survive if it allowed selective conscientious objection
to war. 712 Nor would it allow trespass or interference with the pri-
vate rights of others. A government interest is sufficient if it is so
important that it is not conceivable that the government would
waive it even if the religious needs of the majority so required. 73
168 Id at 207.
169 Contrast Goldman v Weinberger, 475 US 503 (1986).
170 Contrast United v Lee, 455 US 252 (1982).
7 Contrast Lyng v Northwest Indian Cemetary Protective Ass'n, 485 US 439 (1988).
77' Compare Gillette v United States, 401 US 437 (1971).
17' This is similar to David Strauss's formulation of the intent standard in equal protec-
tion cases:
A court applying the discriminatory intent standard should ask: suppose the adverse
effects of the challenged government decision fell on whites instead of blacks, or on
men instead of women. Would the decision have been different? If the answer is yes,
then the decision was made with discriminatory intent.
David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U Chi L Rev 935,
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No doubt cases will arise in which these principles are inappli-
cable or incomplete, and in which the judicial task is more indeter-
minate. Cases involving children are particularly difficult (as they
are when arising under other constitutional provisions). But these
principles are sufficient to resolve the large majority of free exer-
cise cases that have come before the Supreme Court in recent years
without the need for unconstrained case-by-case balancing. In
some instances, the principles suggest that the Court has been
plainly wrong in denying free exercise claims. But the broader
point is that the Free Exercise Clause, properly understood, does
not pose the problem of subjective judicial discretion so feared by
the majority in Smith.
E. The Rule of Law
The deepest and most important theme of the Smith opinion
is its perception of a conflict between free exercise exemptions and
the rule of law. The Court refers to exemptions as "a private right
to ignore generally applicable laws. ' 174 Elsewhere, it states that to
apply the compelling interest test rigorously "would be courting
anarchy" and warns against making "each conscience . ..a law
unto itself. '175 These fears are an unconscious echo of John Locke,
who wrote in his Letter Concerning Toleration that "the private
judgment of any person concerning a law enacted in political mat-
ters, for the public good, does not take away the obligation of that
law, nor deserve a dispensation." 76
Viewed through the lens of legal positivism, this concern is
wholly out of place in the context of a written constitution with a
provision that, by hypothesis, authorizes exemptions. The Court it-
self concedes that there is nothing inappropriate or "anomalous"
about legislation that makes exceptions for religious conflicts. Pre-
sumably, legislation of this sort is valid whether it is specific (like
laws exempting the Native American Church from the ban on con-
sumption of peyote) or general (like laws requiring employers to
make reasonable accommodations of their employees' religious
needs). Although the judicial role is broader when the legislation is
general, the Court would not say that such legislation is therefore
957 (1989). If Strauss is correct, this would suggest that the free exercise exemptions doc-
trine has more in common with Washington v Davis than indicated in the discussion above.
171 110 S Ct at 1604.
175 Id at 1605-06.
176 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in Maurice Cranston, Locke on Poli-
tics, Religion, and Education 104, 136 (Macmillan, 1965)
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improper or unconstitutional. Why, then, is it problematic for the
People to enact a similar provision into constitutional law? From
the perspective of legal positivism there is no difference between
statutes and constitutional amendments. Both are commands of
the sovereign.
If there is nothing wrong with statutory commands of the sov-
ereign that make exceptions from generally applicable laws in cases
of conflict with religious conscience, then there should be nothing
wrong with constitutional commands of the same sort. 177 To Locke,
the right to claim exemptions was tantamount to the right to re-
bellion, since there was no written constitution expressing the sov-
ereign will in a form superior to legislation, and no institution of
judicial review to mediate claims of exemption. 17 8 To the modern
Supreme Court, the claim to exemptions is a routine matter of in-
yoking the supreme law of the land. There is nothing lawless or
anarchic about it.
From the perspective of legal positivism, free exercise exemp-
tions do not make each conscience "a law unto itself." An arm of
the government, the court, decides in each instance what the reach
of the law will be. The Free Exercise Clause draws a boundary be-
tween the powers of the government and the freedom of the indi-
vidual, but that boundary is defined and enforced by the govern-
ment. The significance of the Free Exercise Clause is that the
definition and enforcement of the boundary is entrusted to the
arm of the government most likely to perform the function dispas-
sionately and best equipped to consider the specifics of the case.
The individual believer is not judge in his own case.
From a natural rights perspective, the Court's concerns about
the rule of law are more substantial. According to eighteenth-cen-
"I To be sure, this assumes that the Free Exercise Clause was intended to authorize
exemptions as a matter of positive law, which is the ultimate issue. But the Court's jurispru-
dential qualms about the rule of law are irrelevant to determining whether that is the cor-
rect reading of the clause, just as they would be irrelevant to an interpretation of a particu-
lar statute that appears to carve out a religious exemption.
178 Interestingly, Locke uses the same term-the "appeal to heaven"-in the Letter
Concerning Toleration to describe what the believer should do if the magistrate makes a
command at odds with the commands of God, and in The Second Treatise of Government
to describe what the body of the people should do if the government does not honor the
social contract. Compare Letter Concerning Toleration at 137 (cited in note 176), with John
Locke, The Second Treatise of Government § 242 in Peter Laslett, ed, Two Treatises of
Government 267, 427 (Cambridge, student ed 1963) (originally published 1698). The "ap-
peal to heaven" in the Letter appears to be in the literal, spiritual sense. The "appeal to
heaven" in the Second Treatise is a reference to rebellion. The use of the same terminology
accentuates the connection between conscience and rebellion in the absence of a written
constitution and judicial review.
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tury legal thought, freedom of religious conscience was not a prod-
uct of the sovereign's will but a natural and inalienable right. The
New Hampshire Constitution of 1784, for example, declared:
"Among the natural rights, some are in their very nature unalien-
able, because no equivalent can be given or received for them. Of
this kind are the RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE. 1' .7  George Wash-
ington addressed the Hebrew Congregation of Newport, Rhode Is-
land, in these words: "It is now no more that toleration is spoken
of, as if it was by the indulgence of one class of people, that an-
other enjoyed the exercise of their inherent natural rights."' 80 The
reason the rights of conscience were deemed inalienable is that
they represented duties to God as opposed to privileges of the in-
dividual.18' Thus, the Free Exercise Clause is not an expression of
the will of the sovereign but a declaration that the right to practice
religion is jurisdictionally beyond the scope of civil authority. This,
then, is an anarchic idea: that duties to God, perceived in the con-
science of the individual, are superior to the law of the land.
82
That the idea may be anarchic does not mean that we should
dismiss it, for there is reason to believe that this inalienable rights
understanding is the genuine theory of the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment. One of the leading expositions of the thinking
of the day about government and religion, James Madison's Me-
morial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, makes
the point in this way:
Before any man can be considered as a member of Civil Soci-
ety, he must be considered as a subject of the Governor of the
Universe: And if a member of Civil Society, who enters into
any subordinate Association, must always do it with a reserva-
tion of his duty to the general authority; much more must
every man who becomes a member of any particular Civil So-
179 2 Poore's at 1280-81 (cited in note 38).
180 John C. Fitzpatrick, ed, 31 The Writings of George Washington 93-94 n 65 (GPO,
1939).
181 See James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,
reprinted as an appendix to the dissenting opinion in Everson v Board of Education, 330
US 1, 64 (1947) (The right of religious freedom "is unalienable also; because what is here a
right towards men, is a duty towards the Creator.").
181 More accurately, this idea is not anarchic but dyarchic. The individual is not free
from law; he is subject to two potentially conflicting sources of law, spiritual and temporal.
This is an important distinction, because the established tenets of a religious tradition have
their own dynamic safeguards of order and good sense, superior to individual will. See F.A.
Hayek, in W.W. Bartley III, ed, The Fatal Conceit 66, 88 (Chicago, 1988).
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ciety, do it with a saving of his allegiance to the Universal
Sovereign.' 8
Note the contrast between the Smith opinion and Madison's Me-
morial and Remonstrance. Smith insists that conscience must be
subordinate to civil law; Madison insists that civil law must be
subordinate to conscience.
At its very core, the Free Exercise Clause, understood as
Madison understood it, reflected a theological position: that God is
sovereign."" It also reflected a political theory: that government is
a subordinate association. The theological and political positions
are connected. To recognize the sovereignty of God is to recognize
a plurality of authorities and to impress upon government the need
for humility and restraint. To deny that the government has an
obligation to defer, where possible, to the dictates of religious con-
science is to deny that there could be anything like "God" that
could have a superior claim on the allegiance of the citizens-to
assert that government is, in principle, the ultimate authority.
Those are propositions that few Americans, today or in 1789, could
accept.
CONCLUSION
According to the Smith opinion, the argument for free exercise
exemptions "contradicts both constitutional tradition and common
sense."'185 Unfortunately, the Court never presents that argument
so that readers might be able to judge for themselves. The argu-
ment is this: the Free Exercise Clause, by its very terms and read
in the light of its historic purposes, guarantees that believers of
every faith, and not just the majority, are able to practice their
religion without unnecessary interference from the government.
The clause is not concerned with facial neutrality or general appli-
cability. It singles out a particular category of human activities for
particular protection, a protection that is most often needed by
practitioners of non-mainstream faiths who lack the ability to pro-
tect themselves in the political sphere, but may, on occasion, be
needed by any person of religious convictions caught in conflict
with our secular political culture.
183 Reprinted in Everson, 330 US at 64.
114 Among the framers and ratifiers, some presumably accepted the theological position
as a matter of personal faith, while others (perhaps even Madison) merely respected and
deferred to the prevailing religious commitments of the people.
181 110 S Ct at 1603.
1152 [57:1109
Free Exercise Revisionism
For this protection the Smith opinion substitutes a bare re-
quirement of formal neutrality. Religious exercise is no longer to
be treated as a preferred freedom; so long as it is treated no worse
than commercial or other secular activity, religion can ask no more.
The needs of minority religion are no longer to be legally entitled
to equal consideration from the state. If practitioners of minority
religions cannot protect themselves, that is the "consequence of
democratic government," which they should recognize as
"unavoidable."
I do not believe that constitutional principles should be cho-
sen on the basis of our own normative judgments, divorced from
constitutional text and tradition. I would prefer that Smith be de-
cided on the basis of the constitutional text, history, and preced-
ent. But if it is necessary to confront the normative question di-
rectly, I would say that a full guarantee for religious freedom is
preferable to a largely redundant equal protection clause for reli-
gion, and that a genuine neutrality toward minority religions is
preferable to a mere formal neutrality, which can be expected to
reflect the moral and religious presuppositions of the majority. To
be sure, this will increase the power and discretion of judges. But
that seems a weak justification for the Smith opinion's reinterpre-
tation of the Free Exercise Clause. Indeed, when the Constitution
imposes limits on governmental power, interpretation of those lim-
its in marginal cases is-to borrow some of the Smith Court's
words-the "unavoidable consequence" of constitutionalism.
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